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READING KANT IN TEHERAN. 
TOWARDS A RECEPTION OF THE IRANIAN 
RECEPTION OF EUROPEAN PHILOSOPHY 
Roman Seidel, University of Zurich (URPP Asia and Europe)  
Abstract   
The purpose of this article is to furnish insights into the variety of ways in which European 
philosophy has been, and is being, received in Iran. The reception of Kantian thought in Iran 
exemplifies in significant ways the transmission of European philosophy into a non-European 
context, since the philosophy of Kant is discussed by a variety of intellectuals and scholars and in 
many different ways. The article first briefly discusses the motives of this study along with some 
methodological questions concerning comparative philosophy. It also gives some information 
about the issue of philosophy in Iran. It then focuses on two specific approaches to Kant provided 
by two different Iranian thinkers: on Mehdī Ḥā‟erī Yazdī‟s critique of Kant‟s critique of the onto-
logical proof of God‟s existence, and on Mohammad Moǧtahed Šabestarī‟s references to Kant‟s 
idea of freedom and autonomy. 
On the Purpose of Studying the Reception of Kant in Iran 
In the year 2004 scholars, intellectuals, and politicians all across the world 
celebrated the 200
th
 anniversary of Kant‟s death. It may appear to be yet another 
curiosity from the land of the Ayatollahs, that there have also been reports on 
several international Conferences about Kant in Teheran.1  But is the pheno-
  This article is based on a paper that was originally prepared for the conference “Kant in 
Asia. The Unity of Human Personhood” organized by the department of Religion and Phi-
losophy of Hong Kong Baptist University, 20–23 May 2009. I am grateful to Ralph Weber 
(Zurich), Ulrich Rudolph (Zurich) and Anke von Kügelgen (Berne), who commented upon 
an earlier version of this article. 
1  In the years 2004 and 2005 there have been at least three international conferences on 
aspects of Kantian philosophy held in Teheran. The first of them was conducted by the De-
partment of Philosophy of the ʿAllāmeh Ṭabāṭabā‟ī University, Teheran, under the topic 
“Two Hundred Years After Kant” (Nov. 20th–22nd, 2004), see Gorūh-e falsafeh, dānešgāh-e 
ʿAllāmeh Ṭabāṭabā’ī, 1383/2004–5. The second conference was organized by the Iranian In-
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menon of Iranians spending lots of their time studying a German thinker of the 
18
th
 century of any further interest? Is it really astonishing that this eminent 
thinker is read in Iran like he is read in many other places as well? Does it not 
simply prove, that “our thinker” and his philosophy, “the symbol of European 
enlightenment”, “the foundation of any liberal thought” of “Western democracy” 
and human rights, as “we Europeans” like to see him, has to be studied wherever 
people seek to reach for “Western values”? And furthermore, why should it then 
be more than an interesting anecdote, why should anyone, from a Western 
scholarly perspective, be interested in studying Iranian accounts of Kant‟s 
writings? What can we learn from their readings? Should they not rather learn 
from us when it comes to the interpretation of a thinker, who has been studied in 
the west for over two centuries? Is it not simply a waste of time? I am convinced 
that it is not. One purpose of a study of Iranian interpretations of Kant is to get 
an idea of how and in which different ways doctrines from the European 
philosophical tradition were perceived in Iran. Not in the sense that European 
thought penetrated the intellectual tradition of Iran – as if it was an inflexible 
and dominant invader and the Iranian tradition a clearly defined set of outdated 
doctrines – but rather in the sense of an encounter that led to transformations in 
the understanding of both traditions. I would therefore argue that the trans-
mission of ideas should not be regarded as a simple reproduction, but rather as a 
creative adaptation of knowledge, taking place in a specific context. 
Furthermore, one underlying motive for a study like this is to question the 
still dominant European or “Western” bias within the general project of the 
________________________________ 
stitute of Philosophy (mo’asasse-ye pažūhešī-ye ḥekmat va falsafe-ye īrān) to which eminent 
Western Kant-Scholars such as Manfred Baum, Otfried Höffe and Sally Sedgwick con-
tributed. See MOVAḤED, 2007. The third one entitled “Kant-Seminar. Peace through justice” 
was conducted by the Institute for Political and International Studies in Teheran in colla-
boration with the Orient-Okzident-Forum of Potsdam University on 6th and 7th of February 
2005. To each of them there have been reports, also in German media. For an account of the 
first one see the report of one the German participant CLAUS LANGBEHN in: Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung 30.11.2004 (online-version published at <http://www.qantara.de/web 
com/show_article.php/_c-469/_nr-244/i.html>; for the English version see <http://en. 
qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-478/_nr-208/i.html>, last access 2010-05-06). For 
the second see Otfried HÖFFE‟s very informative personal report in Frankfurter Allgemeine 
Zeitung 19.06.2004 (No. 140, p. 39). A report on the third conference was published by 
Carolin EMKE in Der Spiegel 20.2.2005, No 8, p. 144–148. For a reaction to that report by 
the German co-organizers see SSIP-Mitteilungen 1, 2005, S. 8f. (online <www.ssip-web.de/ 
main/downloads/ika05-1.pdf>, last access 2010-05-06). 
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history of philosophy. A quick look into compendia for the history of philosophy 
reveals that the intellectual history of regions lying outside Europe and North 
America are usually marginalized. The same picture appears, when one looks at 
the curricula being taught at departments of philosophy at Western universities. 
The history of philosophical thought from “Asian civilisations”, for instance, 
commonly falls into the realm of the so-called area studies. That may be 
reasonable as long as the necessary sources are not yet accessible to a wider 
range of scholars. But the results of these area studies in the field of intellectual 
history are often ignored by scholars representing philosophy in an academic 
context. One reason for that may be that they are, from a Eurocentric per-
spective, not interested in whatever “non-Western” intellectual tradition, another 
one that researchers in area studies are themselves often not interested in 
presenting their results in a way that may attract the attention of Western 
academic philosophers. 
Nevertheless, there are philosophers with a specific interest in non-Euro-
pean traditions just like there are scholars who follow the idea of intercultural or 
comparative philosophy. Their perspective is based on the principle that philo-
sophical thinking is a universal human quality, and that the intellectual heritage 
of mankind is therefore not necessarily to be split into disjointed regional or 
cultural fragments. Their comparative approach aims at expanding the canon of 
philosophy, and thereby the scope of philosophical research. Yet intercultural 
philosophy has, at least, to struggle with two major problems: one of them being 
practical, the other one rather systematic in nature. The practical one arise from 
the fact that inter-cultural philosophers are often marginalized, so their influence 
on the community of academic philosophy and on its research agenda turns out 
to be rather limited. The systematic problem lies in the fact, that the notion of the 
“intercultural” often evokes the idea of distinct cultures being responsible for the 
differences in intellectual doctrines. This bears the risk of overemphasizing “the 
(cultural) other”, which is taken as something “authentic” and can only be 
understood in the horizon of “the other”. By arguing that the intellectual world 
of “the other” is inaccessible to anyone who purportedly does not belong to that 
horizon, this approach may result in a kind of essentialist discourse within 
intercultural philosophy which leaves little room for constructive exchange. I 
would like to distinguish the idea of intercultural philosophy from the approach 
of comparative philosophy where, in my understanding, a philosophical issue is 
discussed via the comparison of different intellectual traditions not necessarily 
determined by a specific culture. I am convinced that research in the field of 
intellectual history could support the principle of philosophical thinking as a 
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universal human quality by showing that it always has been part of the human 
business of thinking to overcome cultural, political and ideological borders 
within reciprocal processes in the reception of ideas. 
Western and Islamic Philosophy 
The relation between European or Western and Islamic Philosophy may serve as 
a good example to show, that there has been, on the one hand, a long history of 
such transcultural processes and that, on the other hand, obstacles to overcome 
ideological borders are always present. It clearly makes sense to distinguish 
different traditions of thought, but this often means stressing differences only 
and disregarding or marginalizing the long tradition of mutual influences. 
Sometimes these influences, if considered at all, are perceived as trite imitations 
or simply as translations transmitting a given content from one language to 
another. Therefore adoptions of “Western philosophical thought” are often not 
considered to be original acts of philosophical thinking bringing different tradi-
tions of thought together. 
In the long tradition of mutual influence between Islamic and European 
thought there are roughly three periods of this intercultural transmission of 
knowledge. The first began with the translation movement from the 8
th
 century 
onwards, when a huge amount of scientific literature was translated from Greek 
into Arabic and thereafter commented and transformed. 2  The second period 
would be the reception of Arabo-Islamic philosophy (especially of Ibn Sīnā and 
Ibn Rušd) by thinkers of the Latin Middle Ages from the 11th century onwards.3 
The third period started with the reception of modern Western thought by 
thinkers in the Muslim world. Especially the significance of this 3
rd
 period in the 
general context of the history of philosophy has yet to be examined.4 
2  For a short introduction to the translation movement see D‟ANCONA, 2005: 10–31; ENDRESS, 
1987: 24–61. See also Dimitri Gutas‟ outstanding monograph GUTAS, 1998. 
3  For that period see BURNETT, 2005. 
4  Although there are several important studies of the impact of “European thought” on Islamic 
societies (for the Iranian context see for instance BOROUJERDI, 1996; VAHDAT, 2002), they 
do not focus on a systematic account of the reception of European/Western philosophy in 
the general context of the history of philosophy. It may be added, that the new edition of the 
Ueberweg. Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie is dedicating three volumes to the 
history of philosophy in the Islamic World (Geschichte der Philosophie in der islamischen 
Welt, general editor Ulrich Rudolph, University of Zurich). Vol. 3.2. shall focus on 
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Against this background a study on the reception of Kant in Iran, which 
obviously belongs to the third period, aims, at its least, at freeing European 
intellectual history from its isolation within territorial borders by taking the 
impact of its reception in non-European contexts into account. This could, in the 
long run, even serve current social political purposes. If the cultural history of 
the Muslim world, for instance, were no longer regarded as part of the “radical 
other”, as it is the case in many current debates on Islam and Europe, this could 
support an integrating image of Islam, which is often claimed but at the same 
time prevented by public discourse. For one thing, this is highly important for 
overcoming the logic of “we” vs. “them” and “the self” vs. “the other”, without 
neglecting differences in tradition and culture. 
Philosophy in Iran 
For anyone interested in intellectual traditions and current debates in the Middle 
East the spectrum of intellectual discourses in Iran is itself highly interesting. 
Besides the variety of religious and political voices, which often invoke philo-
sophical concepts of Islamic and Western thinkers, philosophy as an academic 
discipline plays an important role in Iran‟s intellectual life. At Iranian univer-
sities philosophy is, following the East-West-paradigm, split up into “Western 
Philosophy” (falsafe-ye ġarb) and “Islamic Philosophy” (falsafe-ye eslāmī) and 
thus represented and taught as two separate subjects, although in recent times a 
dialogue between these disciplines is becoming more common and the number 
of scholars well versed in both fields is increasing. The reason for this division 
of philosophy in Iran‟s academic system is historical. Western philosophy is a 
relatively young discipline, which rose together with the new European-style 
institutions of learning set up in 19
th
 century Iran partly with the help of Euro-
pean administrators and teachers.5 It was also propagated by Iranian intellectuals 
who had studied abroad, mainly in England, France, or Russia. They presented 
Western political thought and philosophy (especially the materialistic account of 
it, which was en vogue at that time in France and England) as the only remedy 
________________________________ 
philosophy in the 19th/20th century, also explicitly dealing with the reception of “Western” 
philosophy. 
5  For an account of the reformation of the educational system in Qaqar Iran see RINGER, 2001. 
See also EIr “Dar Al-Fonūn”. 
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for the suffered political and cultural inferiority towards the West, and blamed 
the adherence to traditional Islamic thought as the reason for this perceived 
backwardness.6 
Western Philosophy grew within these new institutions of learning consti-
tuting a challenge to the traditional educational system, which used to be under 
the control of the ʿulamā’, religious scholars. When the first universities de-
veloped out of this new educational system, philosophy as a subject essentially 
meant Western philosophy. Today a large number of students and learned people 
welcome this discipline, and translations of a remarkable number from classical 
up to recent Western works of modern thought are available on the Iranian book-
market. 
Islamic philosophy, although often disfavoured by representatives of reli-
gious seminaries, was nevertheless constantly taught and transmitted by Muslim 
and non-Muslim scholars in the social environment of Islamic institutions of 
learning.7 Here again Iran turns out to be a most interesting area of study, be-
cause it has an unbroken and multi-faceted tradition of Islamic philosophy up to 
the present. The idea that the tradition of Islamic philosophy ended with Ibn 
Rušd is still widespread, disregarding the fact that in the eastern part of the 
Muslim world, especially in Iran and the later Shiite dominated regions, another 
branch of philosophy survived, which goes back to a contemporary of Ibn Rušd 
namely Šihābadīn as-Suhravardī (d. 1191) whose doctrines later merged with the 
peripatetic tradition of Ibn Sina (first of all represented by Naṣīr ad-Dīn at-Ṭūsī), 
mystical thought (Ibn Arabī) as well as shiʿi and muʿtazili theological doctrines. 
This tradition, especially in the time between the 13
th
 and the 16
th
 century re-
mains to be studied in greater detail. In the 17
th
 century, we encounter a thinker 
who is regarded to be the master of this integration process, who managed to 
integrate these different traditions into one philosophical system. His name is 
6  The most important intellectuals representing Iran‟s 19th century reformist thought are Mīrzā 
Malkum Ḫān (1833-1908), Mīrzā Āqā Ḫān Kermānī (1853–1896), Mīrzā Fatḥ ʿAlī 
Āḫundzādeh (1812–1878), Abd al-Raḥīm Ṭālebof (1832–1910) and Seyyed Ǧamāl ad-Dīn 
Assadābādī known as al-Afġānī (1838–1897). The literature on these Iranian reformers is 
copious; a concise account of their doctrines is provided by VAHDAT, 2002: 30–61; see also 
MOǦTAHEDĪ, 1384/2005–6. 
7  For a study of the formation of Islamic institutions of learning, see MAKDISI, 1981; ARJO-
MAND, 1999. An account of religious learning in pre-revolutionary Iran is given by FISCHER, 
2003. 
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Ṣadr ad-Dīn aš-Šīrāzī, commonly known as Mollā Ṣadrā.8 In contemporary Iran 
he is recognized as the symbol of an authentic Iranian-Islamic Tradition of 
philosophy. Whether his exclusive status as an extraordinary thinker is over-
estimated can only be judged after having examined the aforementioned period 
in more detail. But today, one will hardly find a traditional Iranian philosopher 
who has not dealt with Mollā Ṣadrā‟s thought. Therefore, anyone who investi-
gates the reception of Kant by traditional Iranian philosophers, will be con-
fronted with this eminent thinker, Mollā Ṣadrā, as well, and will come across the 
most intriguing accounts, in which doctrines of these two thinkers are explicitly 
or at least implicitly compared. 
Significance of Kant in Iran 
But this still does not explain why a study on the reception of European thought 
in Iran should almost exclusively focus on Kant. It might have been as 
reasonable to focus on the reception of “Western thought” in general or of 
another eminent Western thinker in Iran. Besides the writings of Kant, especially 
the thought of Hegel and Heidegger had an enormous influence on various in-
tellectual circles. Also Nietzsche, Popper, Arendt, and – more recently, for 
example – Wittgenstein, Levinas, Gadamer, Ricoeur, Rorty, and Habermas are 
being widely read in Persian translation, and introductions to their thought are 
available, too. What all these thinkers have in common is the fact that the 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant played a decisive role for their thought in one way 
or another. Therefore it makes perfect sense to concentrate on the influence of a 
thinker who is regarded as a milestone in modern intellectual history. 
Besides that, the advantage of focussing on only one thinker enables the 
researcher to provide a more extensive text analysis, in this case of texts by 
Iranian commentators on Kant and the respective text by Kant itself. Thereby, 
the line of argumentation, its intensions, and contexts can be elucidated much 
better than by comments on rather short paraphrases. In my analysis of the 
reception of Kant in Iran, I therefore adopt the following pattern9: First, I discuss 
8  Important studies of Mollā Ṣadrā„s philosophical thinking are RAHMAN, 1975; RIZVI, 2009. 
For a survey of his life and works, see RIZVI, 2007. 
9  The author of this article is currently completing his PhD thesis, in which he – following the 
pattern to be presented here – analyses the reception of Kantian philosophy in Iran in greater 
detail. 
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the account of a specific Iranian thinker and try to display his line of argument. I 
then refer to the respective Kantian source, in order to identify critical or 
problematic aspects of the reading at hand. But the aim is not simply to discover 
inconsistencies of the respective reading, but rather to elucidate its context and 
intensions. Finally, I try to give an evaluation of the significance that the specific 
reading may have for the Iranian and/or the European/German context. If the 
study were to focus on the reception of a wider range of thinkers, this kind of 
close textual analysis would simply not be possible.10 
Furthermore, what is most intriguing about Kant in Iran is that he is studied 
by a broad spectrum of scholars and intellectuals in very different manners. Tra-
ditionalists and liberal intellectuals equally make reference to Kant, though not 
in the same way. Even conservative Islamist thinkers, belonging to the ruling 
political class, sometimes refer to Kant. Among them there are two prominent 
figures: the former speaker of parliament, Ġolām ʿAlī Ḥaddād ʿĀdel, who is 
professor of philosophy at Teheran University and who translated Kant‟s 
Prolegomena from an English version into Persian11, and the present speaker of 
parliament, ʿAlī Lārīǧānī, also philosophy professor at Teheran University, who 
wrote at least two academic monographs on Kant.12 All in all, the literature on 
Kant in Iran is very diverse and the number of publications is constantly 
increasing. 
Before presenting two examples of different approaches to Kant, it might 
be helpful to outline very briefly how Kant was introduced to the intellectual 
tradition of Iran. The name of Immanuel Kant was mentioned for the first time in 
a book of an influential traditional philosopher in 19
th
 century Iran, Āqā ʿAlī 
Zonūzī Tehrānī, who gave no further explanation of his thought, but erroneously 
associated him with a group of atheist thinkers. 13  In the early 1930s ʿAlī 
Foruġhī, a minister of Reza Shah, published the first elaborated introduction to 
Kant‟s writings within the context of his still influential History of European 
Philosophy (seyr-e ḥekmat dar orupa).14 About three decades later, two pro-
minent ideologists of the Islamic Revolution, Morteżā Moṭaharrī and Allāmeh 
Ṭabaṭābā‟i, offered the first important critique from an Islamic background in 
10  The author of this article is currently completing his PhD thesis, in which he – following the 
above mentioned pattern – analyses the reception of Kantian philosophy in Iran in detail. 
11  KANT/ḤADDĀD ʿĀDEL, 1367/1988–9. 
12  LĀRĪǦĀNĪ, 1383/2004; LĀRĪǦĀNĪ, 1383/2004–5. 
13  For the first reference to Kant in writings of Iranian thinkers, see MOǦTAHEDĪ, 1384/2005–6: 
238–244; KADĪVAR, 1384/2005: 551–578. 
14  FORŪGHĪ, 1318/1939. 
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their extensive critical assessment of Western thought (osul-e falsafeh va ravesh-
e realism).15 But it was not before the late 1970s that a traditional Iranian philo-
sopher would study Western philosophy intensively and give a critical 
evaluation of some of Kant‟s doctrines by referring to Kant‟s writings 
themselves and not merely to some paraphrases of his thought. The first 
translation of Kant‟s Critique of Pure Reason appeared in the early 1980s.16 
Kant and Metaphysics: 
Critical Reception among Recent Islamic Philosophers in Iran 
Mehdī Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, whose critique of Kant‟s approach to ontology I will dis-
cuss in the following, was born in 1923. He had a traditional education in juris-
prudence, theology and especially Islamic philosophy. His father was the re-
nowned Ayatollah Abdol Karīm Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, the founder of the theological 
seminars in Qom. From the early 1960s on, he lived for about 20 years in the 
U.S. and Canada, where he studied Western philosophy and earned a Ph.D. from 
the University of Toronto in 1979.17 Shortly after the Iranian revolution he re-
turned to Iran. There, he soon distanced himself from the political doctrines and 
practice of Khomeini and his followers, which led to a break of the formerly 
friendly relationship between him and Khomeini.18 
Ḥā‟erīs firsthand access to Western philosophy was unique at that time 
among traditional Iranian ʿulamā’ trained in Islamic Philosophy. Ḥā‟erīs writ-
ings show indeed a considerable acquaintance with the Western texts he deals 
with. But his aim is not a trans-cultural point of view, but rather an apologetic 
one, and his comparative discussions are often quite polemic. 
15  For an evaluation of the importance of this work in the context of Iranian reception of Euro-
pean thought, see GÖSKEN, 2008. 
16  This translation was prepared by Mīr Šams-ad-Dīn Adīb Solṭānī and appeared shortly after 
the Islamic Revolution in 1980, KANT/ADĪB SOLṬĀNĪ. It is no longer available on the Iranian 
book market, and to date it has not been translated another time. The main source for the 
study of Kant‟s theoretical philosophy in Persian is Ḥaddād ʿĀdel‟s translation of the Pro-
legomena.  
17  His PhD thesis, written in English, first appeared in Teheran in 1982. In 1992 it was pub-
lished again in New York in the SUNY series in Islam edited by Seyyed Hossein Nasr, who 
also wrote a foreword to that edition, see ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1992. 
18  For an overview of Ḥā‟erī‟s life and work, see HAJATPOUR, 2005: 15–24. 
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A few years before his death in 1999, however, he wrote his last mono-
graph, ḥekmat va ḥokūmat, which still has no permission to be published in Iran 
and for that reason was printed in London.19 This work argues for an under-
standing of the human as a responsible citizen who has the task of self-
determined government as the vicegerent of God on earth. It can, consequently, 
be regarded as the attempt of a philosophical refutation of the Islamic Republic‟s 
state-doctrine velāyat-e faqīh, from a rather subjectivist and liberal Islamic per-
spective.20 Although this political work might be his most popular one, its under-
lying doctrines are already developed by him in his earlier ontological, episte-
mological, and ethical works. What is most intriguing about his practical and 
political thought is that he seems to rely somehow on a Kantian notion of auto-
nomy without giving any explicit reference to Kant in that context, whereas in 
his metaphysical writings, he criticizes Kant directly. It would be most inter-
esting to discuss Ḥā‟erī‟s ambiguous relation towards Kant, but in the following 
I will confine my discussion to metaphysics, since Ḥā‟erī‟s arguments in this 
respect represent an important strand in the reception of Kant in Iran. 
The point of departure in this discussion is the assumed diminution of Being by 
Kant, which can be especially observed in a chapter of the transcendental dia-
lectic of his Critique of Pure Reason, entitled “On the impossibility of an onto-
logical proof of the existence of God”.21 For Ḥā‟erī, following a main argument 
common to the manifold tradition of Islamic philosophy, Being is the fundamen-
tal component of reality. He therefore regards, as he repeatedly states, ontology 
or the study of Being as the very foundation of philosophy. 
In the following I will sum up some of Ḥā‟erī‟s ontological views, which 
he himself understood as essential for all of his philosophical reflections.22 The 
concept of Being, he argues, is the most comprehensive and universal concept 
which can possibly be imagined. Any definition of a thing is based on it, while it 
cannot be defined by anything more universal and is therefore lacking any kind 
of definition. The subject of each science is finally defined as something „being‟ 
and it is therefore grounded in ontology. 
19  ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1995. 
20  For a study of Ḥā‟erī Yazdī‟s political thought see HAJATPOUR, 1998: 234–304. 
21  KANT, 1998: KrV A592/B620–A602/B632. 
22  Ḥā‟erī Yazdī, therefore, discusses his ontological doctrines in almost all of his major works, 
these being ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969b; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 
1360/1981a; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1360/1981b; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1995. 
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Ḥā‟erī further distinguishes between the “concept of Being” (mafhūm-e 
woǧūd) and the “reality of Being” (ḥaqīqat-e woǧūd). Whereas the concept of 
Being, as Ḥā‟erī argues, can easily be accessed by human reason as a mental 
phenomenon related to every phenomenon in the world, the “reality of Being” as 
its correspondent counterpart is therefore not accessible to human reason as 
such. In addition this reality of Being has to be understood as a single unity or as 
the “unity/unicity of being” (waḥdat-e woǧūd), an idea which has been intro-
duced into the Islamic philosophical tradition by the followers of Ibn ʿArabī. The 
idea by which Ḥā‟eri tries to explain the relation between the unity of Being and, 
plurality of Being is the concept of taškīk al-wuǧūd „gradation of Being‟. This 
concept, which Ḥā‟erī associates with Mollā Ṣadrā, still holds Being as one 
single unity, but a unity having different grades of intensity. Ḥā‟erī compares 
this to a beam of light, which may appear in different grades of intensity, while it 
still remains the same light. All the different existents, which can be observed in 
the outside world by way of their representation in the mind, do not differ from 
each other in their being existent but rather by their different grades of Being. 
The different entities therefore represent different shares of Being (ḫiṣaṣ al-
wuǧūd), like the waves in the ocean, which are existent by one and the same 
ocean but appear as different and limited shares of it. What constitutes or frames 
a specific share of Being is its Essence or Quiddity. Whereas Being shows that a 
certain entity is, Quiddity shows what it is. The mind (ẕihn) has the capacity to 
analytically discern these Quiddities from Being and regard them as independent 
universals (kullī), but in reality they cannot be separated from Being, since it is 
Being which makes them real. Although Being and Quiddity are inseparable 
from each other they are not one and the same. Except in the case of the supreme 
or ultimate Being, since here Being is the very Essence of itself. This supreme 
Being is, furthermore, the only Being which necessarily is existent through itself 
(wāǧib al-wuǧūd fī dātihī). All the other beings are contingent or possible beings 
and do not necessarily exist through themselves, because in their Quiddities 
Being cannot be included, it is added to them by an external cause. This cause, 
the necessary and supreme Being, is regularly associated with God, which con-
stantly brings all the existents into being in an creative act.23 
Kant‟s discussion of Being in the above mentioned chapter, to which Ḥā‟erī 
refers almost exclusively, constitutes a double challenge to Ḥā‟erīs ontological 
doctrine. First, because of Kant‟s argument that Being cannot be a real predicate, 
23  For a discussion of the relation between Existence and Quiddity in Islamic philosophy, see 
NASR, 1989. 
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and, second, because he argues that even if Being may be part of the concept of 
God, the supreme Being, that still would not necessarily prove his real existence. 
To understand Kant‟s line of argument let me first briefly introduce the so called 
ontological proof, which goes back to Anselm of Canterbury. It is an attempt to 
prove God‟s existence out of the concept of God alone. Put simply, the argument 
runs as follows: if God is defined as the most perfect entity that one can imagine, 
then he has to be existent, because if he would not be existent, he would no 
longer be the most perfect entity, since he would be lacking an important attri-
bute, namely existence, which would contradict his definition. This argument, 
which has a long history of modifications and refutations, I do not want to 
discuss any further.24 The point here is Kant‟s reaction to this kind of arguments. 
He says, Being can never be a real predicate, since Being does by no means 
extend or broaden the concept of a thing.25 For the concept of something it 
makes no difference whether it is existent or not, since there would be no contra-
diction concerning the concept of a thing if you deprive it of Being. If we talk, 
for instance, about a red chair and then say that it exists or does not exist, we 
will still be talking about a specific red chair, but if we say it is not red, we will 
not be talking about the same chair anymore. Because of this, Kant argues, 
Being cannot be a real predicate, and, therefore, not be an attribute that defines 
God. Someone who says “God is” does not add a new predicate to the concept of 
God, but he simply claims a relation of the entirety of possible predicates for 
God to an object. This kind of relation between concept and object can only be 
proven by experience. But experience is bound to the world of senses (intuition/ 
Anschauung). As far as the meaning of Being is concerned, Kant says that it 
plays the role of the Copula – and it may seem that he means it exclusively – 
24  The literature on the ontological argument is immense. For an overview of the issue, see for 
example RÖD, 1992. 
25  Kant discusses this argument in the context of his refutation of the ontological proof, the 
respective passage is this KANT, 1998: KrV A597/B625 – A602/B632, especially A598f./ 
B626f. For Ḥā‟erī‟s Persian version of this passage, see ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 203f. 
Ḥā‟erī‟s source of Kants Critique of Pure Reason was the translation of Norman Kempt 
Smith, see Immanuel Kant, Norman Kempt SMITH (trans.), Critique of Pure Reason, Lon-
don 1958: 504f. (Online version: <http://humanum.arts.cuhk.edu.hk/Philosophy/Kant/cpr/ 
cpr-open.html#cpr-toc-B>, last access 2010-05-09.) 
 Ḥā‟erī was also aware of the Arabic version of the Critique of pure reason translated by 
Aḥmad aš-Šībānī, which he considerd to be inaccurate. See ḤĀ‟ERĪ 1347/1969a: 40-42. For 
a most interesting account of Arabic translations of Kant see the article “Kant auf Arabisch” 
by Michael Frey and Aysun Aly in this issue. 
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which connects subject and predicate. The central role as a philosophical 
concept, which the notion of Being used to have, thereby seemed to be abolished 
and ontology as first philosophy to be dismissed. 
For Ḥā‟erī, to whom Being is the central philosophical concept, this kind of 
a claim could not be left unanswered. So how does he react to Kant‟s statements 
concerning Being? First of all, he associates the above-mentioned relation be-
tween concept and object with the relation between Essence (māhīya) and Being 
(wuǧūd). Within this highly important discussion in the context of Islamic philo-
sophy, he follows those who argue that Quiddity cannot include Being, since it is 
Being as the all-embracing reality that grants the reality of all Quiddities. Adher-
ing to that doctrine, Ḥā‟erī follows Kant when he states that Being cannot be a 
predicate in the sense that it broadens the concept of something, because, Ḥā‟erī 
argues, a certain concept or Quiddity would indeed not be broadened by its 
Existence.26 But in another sense, he further argues, an extension takes place, 
though not for the concept, but for the knowledge about the concept. It is the 
knowledge that there really is a corresponding object to the concept or Quiddity. 
In reality, it makes a fundamental difference whether something is existent only 
as a concept in one‟s mind or also as an object outside the mind. The knowledge 
about the concept‟s real existence is not part of the concept itself but, like the 
concept, it is a mental phenomenon or – as Ḥā‟erī puts it referring to Mullā 
Ṣadrā – a mental being (woǧūd-e ẕehnī).27 
The corresponding object is, as Ḥā‟erī states, yet nothing other than the pre-
dicative being of the concept. Therefore, according to Ḥā‟erī, it is misleading to 
represent a judgement like “a certain thing is”, in which Being is, as even Kant 
admitted, logically and grammatically the predicate, in the form “a certain thing 
is this object”. To transform the judgement in that way would obviously serve 
only the purpose of showing that Being is not a real predicate but merely a 
Copula. But in fact, as Ḥā‟erī says, not only in the first form of the judgement 
but also in the second, predicative Being has to be presupposed, since the Copula 
would not make sense, if one would not, at least, assume the existence of the 
subject and the predicate. Ḥā‟erī is therefore convinced that Being has to be 
more than merely a Copula.28  
I shall not attempt to delve further into the discussion of predication here. 
The example should simply display some of Ḥā‟erī‟s strategies to re-establish 
26  ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1360/1981b: 17f., 34f., 159; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 333f. 
27  ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1360/1981b: 18f., 35f.; ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 211f; 334f. 
28  ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1360/1981b: 68; 159f. 
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the fundamental role of Being by criticizing Kant‟s line of argument in his 
chapter on the ontological proof. 
It is true that Ḥā‟erī may in some respects not have done justice to Kant‟s 
understanding of Being. For instance, to discuss it almost exclusively in the con-
text of Kant‟s critique of the ontological proof means to neglect other passages 
in which he deals with the question of Being in a more constructive manner. 
Furthermore, Kant did not really argue that Being is to be understood as a Copu-
la only, although he has often been misinterpreted in that way. Kant argued in 
the respective passage to which Ḥā‟erī is referring that Being can be either a 
Copula or Being as a position, meaning the relation between a certain concept, 
with all its predicates, and a certain object.29 But it is also true that in the chapter 
on the ontological proof, the positive meaning of Being as position is not further 
developed. It is therefore not surprising that one may read it as a definitive 
attempt to overcome the central role of Being. But still, Ḥā‟erī‟s critical 
assessment in which he argues against Kant can also be used in order to support 
another reading of Kant‟s ontology. Let me only point out one interesting aspect: 
Ḥā‟erī‟s argument that predicative Being has at least to be assumed and the 
knowledge about a certain concept as a mental Being will be broadened as soon 
as one knows about its real existence, may be read in the context of Kant‟s trans-
cendental doctrine of epistemology. Put simply, Kant argues that an object can 
only be known as an object by the representation (Vorstellung) of it in the 
knower‟s mind. Only through this representation is the knower capable of 
understanding the perceived sense-data as a single unity, i.e. a single object.30 
Something similar applies to Ḥā‟erī‟s notion of mental existence, which he links 
to Mollā Ṣadrā.31 To what extent Ḥā‟erī really is close to Kant‟s transcendental 
doctrine of knowledge has to be further investigated, but at least one similarity 
can be claimed: Being as a mental representation makes the knowledge of 
external Being possible. 
I will refer only briefly to Ḥā‟erī‟s reaction to Kant‟s second argument 
against the ontological proof of God‟s existence. Kant argued that even if we 
consider Being to be part of the concept of God that could not prove God‟s real 
existence. Because as a part of the concept, the judgement “God is existent” 
would be an analytical judgement. But an analytical judgement is by definition 
29  “Es [Sein, R.S.] ist bloß die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich 
selbst. Im logischen Gebrauche ist es lediglich die Copula eines Urteils.“ KANT, 1998: KrV 
A598/B626. 
30  KANT, 1998: KrV A92/B124–A94/B126; NEUMANN, 2006: 306–312. 
31  ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 219–297. 
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restricted to the conceptual level. If one wants to prove its existence in reality, a 
proof by experience would be necessary. In the respective context, one could 
argue that the existence of God is part of the concept of God, but still his real 
existence could only be proven under the condition of his existence, which has 
to be proven by experience. That, Kant argued, cannot be considered a proof but 
is a tautology. An existential judgement is always a synthetic one. And as in 
each synthetic judgement, you can negate the predicate without causing a contra-
diction in the subject.32  
Ḥā‟erī follows Kant in his argument that one can never infer from an ana-
lytic judgement the necessity of the subject‟s existence and that each existential 
judgement has to be a synthetic one.33 But he opposes Kant‟s conviction that 
existence can be proven only a posteriori, i.e. by experience, since he denies the 
consequence that only the existence of sensual objects can be known. Further-
more, he criticizes that the manner in which Kant displayed the attempt of a 
proof of God‟s existence is not correct, since he described it as if it were the 
proof of a contingent being, namely by trying to relate an object of the sensual 
world to a concept. That must fail, because God obviously does not belong to the 
sensual sphere. Furthermore, in the case of God as the supreme Being, relating 
the concept to an object, i.e. relating Quiddity to Being, is not feasible, since in 
the case of the supreme Being they are one and the same. Ḥā‟erī argues that 
Kant is finally restricting Existence to the sensual world, which contradicts the 
idea of Being representing a comprehensive concept and the totality of reality at 
the same time.34 
This is not an exhaustive discussion of Ḥā‟erī‟s reaction to Kant‟s argument 
against the ontological proof of God‟s existence, and it is not about who is right 
and who wrong. Its aim is rather to indicate how knowledge of the intellectual 
background of a thinker can be helpful in order to understand his reception of 
someone else‟s thought. In this case, it constitutes an example for a transaction 
between modern Western and Islamic thought. 
Let me evaluate this account of Ḥā‟erī‟s positions: first of all, it has become 
clear that both thinkers have a different understanding of the meaning of Being. 
Whereas for Kant Being – or at least the knowledge of it – necessarily cor-
responds with objects of the sensual world, for Ḥā‟erī, following his meta-
32  KANT, 1998: KrV B621–B626. 
33  ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 331f. 
34  ḤĀ‟ERĪ YAZDĪ, 1347/1969a: 215–217. 
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physical tradition, Being can certainly not be restricted to the perceptible world 
of senses only. It has to include ideas that may be thinkable but lie beyond the 
scope of what can be known by experience. Whereas Kant shows that one has to 
distinguish carefully between what can be thought by the human mind and what 
can be known by it, Ḥā‟erī is convinced that the Kantian notion of Being, as it is 
displayed in his discussion of the ontological proof, has to be reconsidered. 
What is most intriguing about Ḥā‟erī‟s approach, especially in the context of 
transcultural reception of knowledge, is the fact that there are some recent stu-
dies of Western Kant-experts firmly rooted in the tradition of a metaphysical or 
ontological interpretation of Kant‟s thought.35 This tradition has its origins in the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, with Martin Heidegger being one of its most 
prominent exponents.36 These thinkers are in a somewhat similar, although not 
identical, manner concerned with re-establishing the role of Being within the 
system of Kantian thought. 
It would be a promising task to, for instance, compare Ḥā‟erī‟s approach to 
Kant and his references to Molla Ṣadrā with recent ontological readings of Kant 
in a German academic context. This may be but one opportunity for a dialogue 
between European and Iranian scholars interested in Kant, since for both of them 
there would be a whole tradition to become aware of, the Iranian tradition of 
Mollā Ṣadrā, and the German tradition of ontological interpretations of Kant. 
Kant, Freedom and Autonomy 
I now turn to another aspect of Kantian thought, namely his practical philo-
sophy, and its reception in Iran. Again, there are many thinkers working on Kant 
in this context. I shall discuss an account of an Islamic intellectual from Iran, 
who may serve as a good example for the liberal religious spectrum. 
Moḥammad Moǧtahed Šabestarī, an Iranian intellectual and critic of the 
current political establishment, started his career in the theological seminars of 
Qom, studying Islamic Law and Theology as well as philosophy and mysticism. 
In 1970, Šabestarī became director of the Shiite Islamic Center in the Imam Ali 
Mosque in Hamburg, where he was later succeeded by the former Iranian Pre-
sident Mohammad Khatami. He also learned German and was able to pursue his 
35  See for instance FICARA, 2006; BICKMANN, 1996; NEUMANN 2006. 
36  For an overview of the ontological interpretation of Kant in the 1920ies, see BAERTSCHI, 
2004. 
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interest, already evident in Qom, in Western philosophy and Christian, espe-
cially Protestant, theology. He studied the writings of theologians such as Paul 
Tillich, Karl Barth, and Karl Rahner, as well as the thought of philosophers such 
as Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Hans-Georg Gadamer. 
His thinking underwent a transformation, from confidence in the popular 
dogma “Islam as solution” to a more emancipatory understanding of religion, 
which is critical towards ideology. This change of direction was virtually para-
digmatic for a whole group of leading religious intellectuals and reformist thin-
kers of the time, all of whom had formerly been staunch supporters of Khomeini 
and proponents of the Islamic Republic. As a Professor of Islamic and Compa-
rative Theology at the University of Teheran, he later (from the 1990s onwards) 
introduced modern philosophical hermeneutics into the religious and political 
discourse in Iran and strongly supported the Christian-Islamic dialogue. 
Besides the merits of having introduced the discussion of philosophical her-
meneutics into the religious intellectual discourse of contemporary Iran, he has 
largely written about the idea of faith as being a concept entirely rooted in free-
dom, which he understands as an essential human attribute. In elaborating this 
doctrine, especially in his book Faith and Freedom (īmān va āzādī)37, he ob-
viously relies on the notion of free will, as it is discussed in the muʿtazilite 
tradition, and beyond that on a Kantian notion of autonomy, although he does 
not refer to it explicitly. For the Muʿtazila, the rationalist school of Islamic theo-
logy, the assumption of a free human will was of crucial importance. Because, in 
their rational-causalist worldview, it would have contradicted the idea of God‟s 
justice, which together with the idea of tauḥīd (God‟s unity) belonged to their 
most fundamental principles, if he were to punish someone in the hereafter for 
deeds which were not grounded on free choice (iḫtīyār) or free will (īrāda). Re-
lying on these principles, the Muʿatzilites, to whom Šabestarī dedicated some 
scholarly work, developed different theological systems, which intended to do 
justice to the idea of free human will.38 
With his reference to Muʿtazilite thought, Šabestarī intended to root his 
concept of free faith in the tradition of Islamic thought. But his discussion of 
freedom goes further, since his idea of freedom is deeply inspired by the notion 
of autonomy and human subjectivity. An autonomous will, he argues in a Kan-
tian manner, is a will which is free of all external influence and based on itself 
37  ŠABESTARĪ, 1378/1999. 
38  For a discussion of the Muʿtazilite doctrin of free will and its deduction from the principle of 
justice, see NAGEL, 1994: 110–114; SCHMIDTKE, 1991: 99-135 (esp. 125ff.). 
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exclusively. This has, of course, to be considered an ideal form of free will. In 
real life, man is naturally always influenced by personal, emotional, cultural, 
social, or historical factors. The task is, therefore, not to get rid of these factors, 
but to become aware of them in order to reflect upon the principles of one‟s acts 
and to judge their moral status. 
Whereas the muʿtazilite idea of free will was based on the argument that 
humans, in order to act morally, are in the end free to choose whether or not they 
like to follow divine law, the principles of which can be acknowledged by 
human reason, Šabestarī, following Kant, goes one step further when he argues 
that freedom means moral and inner freedom, which includes the capacity of 
autonomous lawgiving. At the same time, Šabestarī states, man is an imperfect 
being, neither all-powerful, nor all-knowing, nor even immortal. Faith, therefore, 
means the search for salvation from one‟s own imperfection in the perfection of 
God. 
Furthermore faith is a conscious decision for stability in God that is based 
on the inner freedom of man. This does not mean a one-time decision that is 
valid for all time, but, instead, one that, in face of the constantly changing 
conditions of life, must be renewed again and again. The faithful must con-
tinually reflect upon what belongs to real faith and what does not. This means 
that they must distinguish between behavior based on a freely made inner 
decision, which is hence the result of a spiritual or religious experience, another 
key concept of Šabestarī‟s thought, and conduct that is ultimately a purely 
superficial imitation of religious acts and truisms. In order to achieve such 
awareness, one must seriously and openly come to terms with contemporary cri-
ticisms of religious thinking – whether coming from Muslim or non-Muslim 
sources. Šabestarī thus combines highly self-critical and emancipationist aspi-
rations with the concept of faith. At this point, we finally face the idea of en-
lightenment within the Iranian reception of Kantian thought. It is the demand for 
being capable of self-criticism, and the task of constantly questioning one‟s own 
principles – which is one key element of Kant‟s idea of enlightenment.39 
Based on these ideas, Šabestarī, like many other liberal thinkers, argues for 
a more democratic political system, for the implementation of human rights, and 
for a reconciliation with both religious beliefs in general and the Islamic 
tradition in particular. In this context, we also encounter discussions trying to 
prove the necessity or at least reasonability of believing in God‟s existence, 
39  For Šabestarīs discussion on freedom and autonomy as a precondition of faith, see for 
instance ŠABESTARĪ, 1378/1999:11–42. 
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which refer to Kant‟s so-called moral proof of God, an argument which does not 
attempt to prove God‟s existence, but to argue for the necessity of the assump-
tion of God‟s existence for the sake of human morality. 
Conclusion 
Of course, the two examples discussed here do not represent the whole spectrum 
of the reception of Kant in Iran. There are many other thinkers whom I have not 
mentioned, and there are other approaches with different foci, which should be 
taken into account in order to display a more complete picture. But as a preli-
minary evaluation of this broad spectrum, one could argue, that it may be 
roughly divided into two major fields of interest. The first is represented by 
thinkers who read Kant with a special emphasis on metaphysics. They usually 
come from a traditional Islamic background and are scholars of Islamic 
philosophy. In order to defend their tradition, they either try to disprove Kant‟s 
critical assessment of ontology, or they attempt to reconcile it with their view of 
Islamic metaphysics. The second field of interest is represented by scholars who 
are more concerned with Kant‟s practical philosophy, his ethics and political 
thought. Here again we encounter many different perspectives. There are radical 
Islamist thinkers who oppose Kant‟s ethics in principle, since he is not building 
it on divine law,40 other supporters of the Islamic regime, like Haddād ʿĀdel, try 
to criticize some of Kant‟s doctrines, or they attempt to interpret them in a way 
that supports their own view of Islamic government. Liberal Islamic or secular 
intellectuals rather prefer readings supporting the idea of self-determined 
government and autonomous human subjectivity. For instance, for Šabestarī, as 
for other Islamic liberals, the adaption of a Kantian account of autonomy does 
not contradict its reconciliation with the Islamic tradition, where as even secular 
liberals usually do not refer to the Islamic tradition – which does not necessarily 
mean that they advocate its abolishment. Although it is often the case a 
traditional position in metaphysics does not necessarily lead to authoritarian 
position in politics. Ḥā‟erī, for instance, serves as a good example for a scholar 
who has quite conservative views regarding Islamic metaphysics, while his 
political ideas, although being confident to the notion of Islamic government, are 
dwelling on concepts of freedom and autonomy, whereas some of his contempo-
40  The radical Ayatollah Meṣbāh Yazdī, who categorically refutes Kant‟s ethics in his book 
falsafe-ye aḫlāq may serve as an example for this category See, Meṣbāh YAZDĪ, 1380/2001. 
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raries would support most of his metaphysical positions but harshly oppose his 
political ones. Therefore the adherence to Islamic metaphysics or the Islamic 
tradition in general does not necessarily lead to a refutation of Kant‟s practical 
thought and vice versa. 
To conclude: What does the examination of Iranian accounts of Kant‟s 
writings demonstrate? First of all, it demonstrates that his philosophy is being 
studied by a wide range of scholars in very different ways with different 
purposes and in different contexts. It shows that the comparison with the tradi-
tion of Mollā Ṣadrā, for instance, might lead to interesting new perspectives. But 
beyond that, it may support an awareness for the fact that no one, may he or she 
be arguing from a Western or a non-Western intellectual context, owns the au-
thentic reading of Kant, that even efforts to present something like the essence of 
Kant‟s philosophy are but specific readings of his writings stressing certain 
aspects and marginalizing others. Some of them will certainly seem more rea-
sonable than others, but each of them shows that there is always a specific 
intellectual context and a specific intention behind an interpretation. 
Overemphasizing authenticity bears the risk that one ends up in essentialist 
discourse. Speaking of something like the German or the Iranian philosophy 
often means – at least implicitly – promoting one specific strand of thought as 
being the authentic one. But this means neglecting the fact that in each cultural 
tradition of thinking we encounter a variety of approaches to philosophy existing 
simultaneously. The fact that one may be predominant in a specific period does 
not make it more authentic than others. This is not meant to simply equate plu-
rality and cultural differences, but to look out for the significance of specific 
differences and similarities in the context of a specific philosophical issue, rather 
than to link difference in general to a certain, say the Iranian, culture. Therefore, 
I would prefer to speak of several traditions of thinking and to identify them 
with regard to their systematic foundation or their ideological context rather than 
to a vague cultural background. Since culture seems to be much too broad and 
much too complex a concept, a comparison between different specific traditions 
of thought, be they from one or from various geographical origins, or an analysis 
of their potential mutual influence, seem to me much more fruitful. Analyzing 
the reception of Kant in Iran could be but one example of a kind of comparative 
approach which might encourage more constructive dialogues among philoso-
phers from different intellectual origins bringing different traditions of thought, 
rather than different cultures, onto the stage of discourse. After all, this kind of 
active exchange of ideas across the ideological border between a “Western” and 
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“non-Western” history of ideas may also lead to a critical reassessment of one‟s 
own philosophical self-perception. 
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